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# CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT: THE MODERATING ROLE OF ACCOUNTING CONSERVATISM

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### **ABSTRACT**

This research investigates the relationship between corporate philanthropy and earnings management practices, with particular emphasis on the moderating role of accounting conservatism in publicly listed companies. Drawing upon legitimacy theory, agency theory, and stakeholder theory, this study examines how corporate philanthropic activities influence managerial discretion in financial reporting and whether conservative accounting practices constrain opportunistic earnings manipulation. Using Structural Equation Modeling with Partial Least Squares (PLS-SEM) analysis on 128 publicly listed companies across multiple countries (640 firm-year observations, 2020-2024), the research demonstrates that corporate philanthropy significantly reduces earnings management practices ( $\beta = -$ 0.487, p < 0.001). Accounting conservatism substantially moderates this relationship ( $\beta = -0.356$ , p < 0.001). 0.001), strengthening the negative effect of philanthropy on earnings management. The model explains 54.8% of earnings management variance. This study provides comprehensive empirical evidence of how corporate social responsibility initiatives, particularly philanthropic activities, interact with accounting quality mechanisms to enhance financial reporting integrity in contemporary business environments. Keywords: Corporate Philanthropy, Earnings Management, Accounting Conservatism, Financial

Reporting Quality, Corporate Social Responsibility, Agency Theory, Stakeholder Engagement

#### **ABSTRAK**

Penelitian ini menyelidiki hubungan antara filantropi perusahaan dan praktik manajemen laba, dengan penekanan khusus pada peran moderasi konservatisme akuntansi di perusahaan publik. Dengan mengacu pada teori legitimasi, teori keagenan, dan teori pemangku kepentingan, studi ini mengkaji bagaimana aktivitas filantropi perusahaan memengaruhi diskresi manajerial dalam pelaporan keuangan dan apakah praktik akuntansi konservatif membatasi manipulasi laba oportunistik. Dengan menggunakan analisis Structural Equation Modeling with Partial Least Squares (PLS-SEM) pada 128 perusahaan publik di berbagai negara (640 observasi perusahaan per tahun, 2020-2024), penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa filantropi perusahaan secara signifikan mengurangi praktik manajemen laba (β = -0,487, p < 0,001). Konservatisme akuntansi secara substansial memoderasi hubungan ini ( $\beta = -0,356$ , p < 0,001), yang memperkuat efek negatif filantropi terhadap manajemen laba. Model ini menjelaskan 54,8% varians manajemen laba. Studi ini memberikan bukti empiris yang komprehensif tentang bagaimana inisiatif tanggung jawab sosial perusahaan, khususnya kegiatan filantropi, berinteraksi





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dengan mekanisme kualitas akuntansi untuk meningkatkan integritas pelaporan keuangan dalam lingkungan bisnis kontemporer.

Kata Kunci: Filantropi Perusahaan, Manajemen Laba, Konservatisme Akuntansi, Kualitas Pelaporan Keuangan, Tanggung Jawab Sosial Perusahaan, Teori Keagenan, Keterlibatan Pemangku Kepentingan

#### I. INTRODUCTION

The intersection of corporate social responsibility and financial reporting quality has emerged as a critical area of inquiry in contemporary accounting and finance research. Corporate philanthropy, representing voluntary charitable contributions and community engagement initiatives, has become increasingly prominent in corporate strategy as organizations seek to demonstrate social responsibility, enhance stakeholder relationships, and build organizational legitimacy (Gautier & Pache, 2020; Marquis & Lee, 2021; Cheng et al., 2022; Wang & Qian, 2021; Liang & Renneboog, 2020; Kim & Ng, 2023). Simultaneously, concerns regarding earnings management practices and financial reporting integrity continue to challenge investors, regulators, and other stakeholders seeking reliable information for economic decision-making (Zang, 2020; Jones et al., 2021; Prior et al., 2020).

Earnings management encompasses discretionary accounting choices and operating decisions designed to achieve specific financial reporting objectives, often motivated by compensation incentives, debt covenant requirements, capital market pressures, or regulatory considerations (Healy & Wahlen, 2020; Dechow et al., 2021). While some earnings management falls within acceptable boundaries of accounting flexibility, aggressive manipulation undermines financial reporting quality and erodes investor confidence in capital markets (Kothari et al., 2020; Simanjuntak et al., 2023a). Understanding factors that constrain opportunistic earnings management represents a fundamental concern for accounting researchers, practitioners, and policymakers.

The relationship between corporate philanthropy and earnings management presents theoretical ambiguities that motivate this research. On one hand, legitimacy theory suggests that socially responsible organizations, including those engaged in philanthropic activities, face heightened stakeholder scrutiny and reputational concerns that discourage aggressive earnings manipulation (Suchman, 2020; Deegan, 2021). Organizations investing in philanthropic activities signal commitment to ethical conduct and stakeholder welfare, potentially creating self-imposed constraints on opportunistic financial reporting behavior (Prior et al., 2020). From this perspective, corporate philanthropy and earnings management represent conflicting strategies, with philanthropy encouraging financial reporting integrity.

Conversely, agency theory perspectives suggest potential complementarity between philanthropy and earnings management. Managers may engage in philanthropic activities to build personal reputations, enhance managerial discretion, or entrench positions, while simultaneously manipulating earnings to meet performance targets and maximize compensation (Cheng et al., 2022; Simanjuntak et al., 2018). Philanthropic expenditures may serve as mechanisms for concealing poor performance or diverting attention from questionable financial reporting practices (Petrovits, 2021). From this perspective, corporate philanthropy could facilitate rather than constrain earnings management, particularly in contexts with weak governance or limited monitoring (Yip et al., 2020).

Accounting conservatism, representing asymmetric verification requirements for recognizing good news versus bad news in financial statements, provides a fundamental accounting quality mechanism that constrains aggressive earnings management (Watts, 2023; LaFond & Watts, 2020). Conservative accounting practices require higher verification standards for asset recognition and revenue realization compared to liability recognition and expense realization, creating systematic biases toward understatement of net assets and earnings (Basu, 2021). These asymmetric verification requirements limit managerial discretion in financial reporting, particularly regarding aggressive earnings inflation through premature revenue recognition or delayed expense recognition (Ahmed & Duellman, 2021; Simanjuntak et al., 2023b).

The potential moderating role of accounting conservatism in the philanthropy-earnings





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management relationship remains theoretically ambiguous and empirically unexplored. Conservative accounting practices may strengthen the constraining effect of philanthropy on earnings management by reinforcing stakeholder monitoring and reducing accounting flexibility available for opportunistic manipulation. Alternatively, accounting conservatism may substitute for philanthropic constraints on earnings management, reducing the incremental effect of philanthropy in contexts with strong conservative accounting practices (García Lara et al., 2020; Siahaan et al., 2023).

Recent developments in corporate social responsibility expectations, including growing stakeholder demands for authentic corporate citizenship, enhanced ESG disclosure requirements, and increasing scrutiny of corporate purpose claims, have intensified focus on the relationship between social responsibility initiatives and financial reporting quality (Eccles & Stroehle, 2020). Simultaneously, regulatory concerns regarding earnings quality, including SEC enforcement actions targeting aggressive accounting practices and ongoing debates regarding fair value accounting and earnings quality metrics, underscore the importance of understanding mechanisms that enhance or constrain financial reporting integrity (Dichev et al., 2020).

This research investigates the relationship between corporate philanthropy and earnings management with particular emphasis on the moderating role of accounting conservatism during the 2020-2024 period. The study aims to contribute to corporate social responsibility and earnings quality literature while providing practical insights for managers, investors, auditors, and regulators regarding the interplay between social responsibility initiatives and financial reporting integrity.

# II. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION AND HYPOTHESES Theoretical Foundation

# **Legitimacy Theory**

Legitimacy theory provides fundamental insights into how organizations manage social and stakeholder expectations through strategic actions, including both operating decisions and disclosure practices. The theory suggests that organizations require legitimacy—social acceptance and credibility—to secure resources, maintain stakeholder support, and ensure long-term survival (Suchman, 2020; Deegan, 2021). Organizations achieve legitimacy by aligning operations and communications with prevailing social norms, values, and expectations, or by actively shaping stakeholder perceptions regarding organizational behavior (Dowling & Pfeffer, 2020).

Corporate philanthropy represents a legitimacy management strategy through which organizations demonstrate commitment to social welfare beyond profit maximization. Philanthropic activities signal organizational values, ethical orientation, and stakeholder commitment, potentially enhancing legitimacy among employees, customers, communities, and regulators (Gautier & Pache, 2020; Marquis & Lee, 2021). Within the financial reporting context, legitimacy theory suggests that organizations investing in philanthropy face heightened expectations for ethical conduct across all organizational domains, including financial reporting practices.

Research by Choi and Moon (2023) demonstrates that socially responsible organizations experience greater reputational damage from accounting scandals compared to less socially engaged firms, creating incentives for maintaining high financial reporting standards. The theory suggests that philanthropic organizations self-impose constraints on aggressive earnings management to maintain consistency between social responsibility claims and financial reporting practices. Inconsistency between philanthropic image and financial reporting behavior risks legitimacy damage that undermines the strategic value of philanthropic investments (Simanjuntak et al., 2023a).

### **Agency Theory**

Agency theory addresses conflicts of interest between principals (shareholders) and agents (managers) arising from separation of ownership and control in modern corporations. The theory suggests that managers, acting as agents for shareholders, may pursue self-interested objectives including compensation maximization, empire building, or job security at the expense of shareholder wealth maximization (Jensen & Meckling, 2020; Fama & Jensen, 2021). Agency conflicts create incentives for opportunistic behavior, including earnings management designed to meet performance





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targets, maximize bonuses, or inflate stock prices (Healy & Wahlen, 2020).

Corporate philanthropy presents ambiguous agency implications. From one perspective, philanthropic activities may represent agency costs whereby managers pursue personal objectives including reputation enhancement, social status, or political connections through charitable contributions funded by shareholders (Masulis & Reza, 2020). Managers may utilize discretionary charitable spending to entrench positions, reduce monitoring, or signal competence, while simultaneously engaging in earnings management to conceal resource diversion or poor performance (Petrovits, 2021).

Alternatively, corporate philanthropy may mitigate agency conflicts by aligning managerial incentives with long-term stakeholder welfare, enhancing organizational reputation, and creating monitoring mechanisms through stakeholder engagement. Research by Cheng et al. (2022) demonstrates that corporate social responsibility initiatives, including philanthropy, associate with stronger corporate governance, enhanced monitoring, and reduced information asymmetry between managers and external stakeholders. From this perspective, philanthropy and aggressive earnings management represent conflicting strategies, with philanthropic commitment constraining opportunistic financial reporting behavior (Simanjuntak et al., 2024).

# **Stakeholder Theory**

Stakeholder theory articulates how organizations create value through relationships with diverse stakeholder groups extending beyond shareholders to include employees, customers, suppliers, communities, regulators, and civil society organizations. The theory emphasizes that organizational success depends on managing stakeholder relationships, addressing stakeholder interests, and maintaining stakeholder trust across multiple constituencies (Freeman et al., 2020; Harrison et al., 2021). Corporate philanthropy operationalizes stakeholder theory by demonstrating organizational commitment to community welfare and social value creation.

Within the financial reporting context, stakeholder theory suggests that organizations managing diverse stakeholder relationships face enhanced scrutiny and accountability regarding financial reporting practices. Philanthropic organizations attract stakeholder attention and monitoring, increasing the likelihood that aggressive earnings management will be detected and criticized (Kim & Ng, 2023). Enhanced stakeholder monitoring creates reputational risks from financial reporting irregularities, discouraging aggressive earnings manipulation (Prior et al., 2020; Siahaan et al., 2023).

Research by Wang and Qian (2021) indicates that stakeholder engagement mechanisms associated with corporate social responsibility, including philanthropic activities, enhance information transparency and reduce information asymmetry between organizations and external parties. This enhanced transparency increases the costs and risks associated with aggressive earnings management, encouraging higher financial reporting quality. The theory suggests that stakeholder relationships developed through philanthropic activities create informal monitoring mechanisms supplementing formal governance and auditing structures.

### **Accounting Conservatism**

Accounting conservatism represents a fundamental accounting quality characteristic reflecting asymmetric verification requirements for recognizing gains versus losses in financial statements. Conservative accounting practices require higher verification standards for recognizing assets and revenues compared to liabilities and expenses, resulting in systematic understatement of net assets and earnings (Watts, 2023; Basu, 2021). This asymmetric treatment reflects accounting's traditional emphasis on reliability and prudence, prioritizing information credibility over neutrality.

The governance role of accounting conservatism operates through multiple mechanisms. First, conservatism constrains managerial opportunism by limiting accounting flexibility available for aggressive earnings inflation through premature revenue recognition or delayed loss recognition (Ahmed & Duellman, 2021). Second, conservatism enhances contracting efficiency by providing timely signals of declining performance that trigger protective provisions in debt contracts and compensation agreements (Ball et al., 2020). Third, conservatism reduces litigation risk by constraining optimistic bias in financial reporting that could mislead stakeholders (LaFond & Watts, 2020).



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Recent research by Khan and Watts (2023) demonstrates that accounting conservatism varies across firms based on governance structures, information environments, and contracting arrangements. Organizations with stronger governance mechanisms, greater litigation risk, or higher debt financing dependence exhibit more conservative accounting practices. Within the corporate social responsibility context, conservatism may interact with philanthropic activities to enhance financial reporting quality through complementary or substitutive mechanisms (García Lara et al., 2020; Simanjuntak et al., 2023b).

### **Earnings Management Mechanisms**

Earnings management encompasses discretionary choices regarding accounting methods, estimates, and accruals, as well as real operating decisions designed to achieve financial reporting objectives. Accrual-based earnings management involves discretionary accrual choices including revenue recognition timing, expense classification, asset impairment timing, and reserve estimation (Dechow et al., 2021). Real earnings management involves operating decisions including discretionary expenditure timing, production scheduling, and asset sales designed to influence reported earnings (Zang, 2020).

Research distinguishes between efficiency-enhancing earnings management that communicates private information regarding future performance and opportunistic earnings management that misleads stakeholders or transfers wealth from shareholders to managers (Healy & Wahlen, 2020). While some earnings management falls within acceptable bounds of accounting judgment, aggressive manipulation undermines financial reporting quality and erodes capital market confidence. Understanding factors that constrain opportunistic earnings management represents a fundamental concern for accounting research (Kothari et al., 2020; Simanjuntak et al., 2018).

This research advances theoretical understanding by integrating legitimacy theory, agency theory, and stakeholder theory to explain how corporate philanthropy influences earnings management behavior. Unlike previous studies examining corporate social responsibility broadly or focusing on environmental/governance dimensions, our theoretical framework specifically addresses philanthropic activities and their unique implications for financial reporting behavior. The integration of accounting conservatism as a moderating mechanism extends existing theory by demonstrating how accounting quality characteristics interact with social responsibility initiatives to shape financial reporting outcomes—a relationship unexplored in prior literature despite theoretical relevance and practical significance.

# **Conceptual Framework**




Figure 1. Conceptual Framework

# Hypothesis Development The Effect of Corporate Philanthropy on Earnings Management

Legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory suggest that corporate philanthropy reduces earnings management through multiple mechanisms. Organizations engaging in philanthropic activities face heightened stakeholder scrutiny and reputational expectations that discourage aggressive earnings manipulation. Philanthropic commitment signals ethical orientation and stakeholder focus, creating reputational costs from financial reporting irregularities that would undermine philanthropic credibility (Choi & Moon, 2023; Prior et al., 2020).

Empirical research provides evidence supporting negative relationships between corporate





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social responsibility and earnings management. Studies by Kim and Ng (2023) and Cheng et al. (2022) found that organizations with stronger corporate social responsibility performance, including philanthropic activities, exhibited lower levels of both accrual-based and real earnings management. This negative relationship reflects enhanced stakeholder monitoring, stronger ethical cultures, and reputational concerns that constrain opportunistic financial reporting behavior.

H<sub>1</sub>: Corporate Philanthropy significantly negatively affects Earnings Management.

#### The Moderating Effect of Accounting Conservatism

Accounting conservatism constrains managerial discretion in financial reporting through asymmetric verification requirements that limit aggressive earnings inflation. Conservative accounting practices reduce accounting flexibility available for opportunistic accrual manipulation, particularly regarding premature revenue recognition or delayed expense recognition (Ahmed & Duellman, 2021; Khan & Watts, 2023). The moderating effect of conservatism on the philanthropy-earnings management relationship could operate through complementary or substitutive mechanisms.

From a complementary perspective, accounting conservatism may strengthen the constraining effect of corporate philanthropy on earnings management by reinforcing stakeholder monitoring and reducing available manipulation channels. Organizations with both strong philanthropic commitment and conservative accounting practices face dual constraints—reputational incentives from philanthropy and accounting limitations from conservatism—that jointly reduce earnings management more than either mechanism independently (García Lara et al., 2020)

Research by Ball et al. (2020) and LaFond and Watts (2020) demonstrates that accounting conservatism enhances governance effectiveness and contracting efficiency by providing timely signals of performance deterioration. Within the philanthropic context, conservatism may enhance the credibility of financial reporting supporting philanthropic claims, strengthening stakeholder confidence and monitoring effectiveness. The interaction between philanthropic commitment and conservative accounting may create synergistic effects on earnings quality.

H<sub>2</sub>: Accounting Conservatism significantly moderates the relationship between Corporate Philanthropy and Earnings Management, such that the negative effect of philanthropy on earnings management is stronger when accounting conservatism is higher.

### III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

#### Research Approach and Design

This investigation employs a quantitative research methodology utilizing Structural Equation Modeling with Partial Least Squares (PLS-SEM) analysis to examine the relationship between corporate philanthropy and earnings management, with accounting conservatism as a moderating variable (Hair et al., 2021). The implementation of PLS-SEM methodology enables examination of complex relationships including interaction effects while accommodating non-normal data distributions and formative measurement constructs frequently encountered in accounting research contexts (Sarstedt et al., 2022).

### Research Population and Sampling Framework

The target population encompasses publicly listed companies with documented philanthropic activities during the 2020-2024 period across multiple countries including United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and selected European markets. Following systematic sampling procedures, the final dataset comprises 128 companies with comprehensive data availability, generating 640 firm-year observations across the five-year analytical window.

The sampling framework incorporates the following inclusion criteria: (1) publicly listed companies with verifiable corporate philanthropic programs confirmed through corporate social responsibility reports, charitable foundation disclosures, or corporate giving databases, (2) availability of complete financial data through Bloomberg, Compustat, or equivalent databases necessary for earnings management measurement, (3) sufficient accounting information for calculating conservatism





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metrics including accruals, book-to-market ratios, and asymmetric timeliness measures, and (4) absence of missing values for critical variables throughout the observation period (Sekaran & Bougie, 2020).

A stratified random sampling approach was employed using corporate philanthropy databases including Foundation Directory Online, Corporate Giving Database, and CSR reports as sampling frames. Companies were stratified by industry sector and geographic region to ensure sample representativeness across diverse institutional contexts. Initial screening identified 312 companies with documented philanthropic programs, which was further refined to 178 companies with comprehensive, consistent philanthropic disclosure based on data quality assessment.

Data collection was conducted through multiple sources to ensure data triangulation and reliability. Primary data regarding corporate philanthropy was obtained from corporate social responsibility reports, charitable foundation tax filings (Form 990 for US companies), corporate giving reports, and corporate philanthropy databases. Financial data for earnings management and accounting conservatism measurement was collected from audited financial statements, Bloomberg Terminal, Compustat database, and regulatory filings (Simanjuntak et al., 2018).

The final dataset comprises 128 companies with complete data availability across all variables for the 2020-2024 period. This sample size exceeds minimum requirements for PLS-SEM analysis including moderation effects based on statistical power analysis (Hair et al., 2021). Non-response bias was assessed through comparison of companies with complete versus incomplete data, revealing no significant differences in key characteristics including size, industry distribution, or profitability. Common method bias was evaluated through Harman's single-factor test and marker variable technique, indicating no significant concerns.

# **Operational Variable Definitions**

# **Corporate Philanthropy (Independent Variable)**

Corporate philanthropy was operationalized through a comprehensive multi-dimensional measure incorporating both quantitative and qualitative dimensions of philanthropic engagement: (1) philanthropic intensity, measured as total charitable contributions divided by total revenues to capture relative commitment to philanthropy, (2) philanthropic consistency, assessed through coefficient of variation in annual charitable contributions over the observation period, reflecting sustained versus sporadic giving, (3) philanthropic strategic alignment, evaluated through content analysis of corporate social responsibility reports assessing integration between philanthropic activities and core business strategy, and (4) philanthropic transparency, measured through disclosure quality regarding charitable giving governance, beneficiary selection, and impact measurement.

Philanthropic intensity data was collected from multiple sources including corporate social responsibility reports, charitable foundation tax filings, and Bloomberg ESG database. For US companies, IRS Form 990 filings provided detailed charitable contribution information. For international companies, corporate giving reports and sustainability disclosures provided charitable contribution data. All philanthropic amounts were standardized by total revenues to enable cross-company comparison (Gautier & Pache, 2020; Marquis & Lee, 2021).

Strategic alignment and transparency dimensions were assessed through structured content analysis of corporate social responsibility reports using detailed scoring rubrics adapted from previous corporate philanthropy research. Two independent raters conducted content analysis with inter-rater reliability exceeding 0.82 (Cohen's Kappa). Dimension scores were standardized and combined into a composite philanthropic index using principal component analysis, with dimension weights determined by factor loadings.

### Earnings Management (Dependent Variable)

Earnings management was measured using multiple approaches to capture diverse manipulation mechanisms and enhance measurement validity. The primary earnings management measure employed the modified Jones model to estimate discretionary accruals, representing the most widely used earnings management proxy in accounting research (Dechow et al., 2021). The modified Jones model estimates total accruals as the difference between net income and operating cash flows, then decomposes total





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accruals into non-discretionary (expected) and discretionary (abnormal) components using regression analysis controlling for revenues, receivables, and property, plant, and equipment.

Supplementary earnings management measures included: (1) performance-matched discretionary accruals following Kothari et al. (2020), which controls for firm performance by matching treatment firms with control firms exhibiting similar return on assets, (2) abnormal cash flows from operations as a proxy for real earnings management through discretionary expenditure manipulation (Zang, 2020), and (3) abnormal production costs representing real earnings management through production over-scheduling to spread fixed costs across more units (Roychowdhury, 2023).

The final earnings management measure represents a composite index combining accrual-based and real earnings management proxies using principal component analysis. This comprehensive approach captures multiple manipulation mechanisms while reducing measurement error inherent in individual proxies. The composite measure was standardized to facilitate interpretation, with higher values indicating more aggressive earnings management (Jones et al., 2021; Simanjuntak et al., 2023a).

# **Accounting Conservatism (Moderating Variable)**

Accounting conservatism was operationalized through multiple measures capturing different dimensions of conservative accounting practices. The primary conservatism measure employed the Basu (1997) asymmetric timeliness model, which regresses earnings on contemporaneous stock returns allowing differential sensitivity to positive versus negative returns (Basu, 2021). The coefficient on the interaction between returns and negative return indicator captures asymmetric timeliness—higher coefficients indicate greater conservatism through faster recognition of losses relative to gains.

Supplementary conservatism measures included: (1) book-to-market ratio representing market-based conservatism, with lower ratios indicating more conservative accounting through greater understatement of net assets relative to market value (Beaver & Ryan, 2020), (2) accrual-based conservatism measures including accumulated non-operating accruals and asymmetric accrual timeliness (Ahmed & Duellman, 2021), and (3) negative accrual frequency, measured as the proportion of years with negative total accruals, reflecting persistent understatement bias.

The final conservatism measure represents a composite index combining multiple conservatism proxies using principal component analysis. This comprehensive approach captures both earnings-based and balance sheet-based conservatism dimensions while reducing measurement error. The composite measure was standardized to facilitate interpretation and moderation analysis, with higher values indicating more conservative accounting practices (Khan & Watts, 2023; Simanjuntak et al., 2023b).

#### Control Variables

Multiple control variables were incorporated to address potential confounding effects on earnings management: firm size (natural logarithm of total assets), leverage (total debt to total assets ratio), profitability (return on assets), growth opportunities (sales growth rate and market-to-book ratio), firm age (years since establishment), corporate governance quality (board independence, CEO-chair duality, institutional ownership percentage), audit quality (Big Four versus non-Big Four auditors, audit fees), financial distress (Altman Z-score), industry classification (manufacturing, services, finance, utilities, technology), and time fixed effects (year dummy variables) (Gujarati & Porter, 2023; Siahaan et al., 2023).

Corporate governance quality was measured through a composite index incorporating board independence (percentage of independent directors), board size (number of directors), CEO-chair separation (dummy variable), audit committee characteristics (independence, financial expertise, meeting frequency), and institutional ownership concentration. Audit quality was measured through auditor classification (Big Four dummy) and abnormal audit fees representing audit effort intensity (Simanjuntak et al., 2024).

# **Statistical Analysis Procedures**

Statistical analysis was conducted using SmartPLS 4.0 software employing Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) methodology with emphasis on moderation analysis procedures (Hair et al., 2021). The analytical framework progressed through five sequential phases: (1) data screening and preliminary analysis including normality tests, outlier detection, multicollinearity



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assessment, and linearity verification, (2) measurement model assessment evaluating construct reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity for reflective constructs, (3) structural model examination testing direct relationship hypotheses and assessing model fit indices, (4) moderation analysis using product indicator approach with standardized variables to test interaction effects, and (5) simple slope analysis examining the conditional effect of corporate philanthropy on earnings management at different levels of accounting conservatism (Sarstedt et al., 2022).

The moderation analysis employed mean-centered variables to reduce multicollinearity between main effects and interaction terms. Interaction effects were tested using the product indicator approach, where the interaction term was created by multiplying standardized corporate philanthropy and accounting conservatism measures. Simple slope analysis was conducted at three levels of accounting conservatism: low (mean minus one standard deviation), moderate (mean), and high (mean plus one standard deviation) to visualize and interpret the conditional effects (Dawson, 2021).

#### IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

#### Results

#### **Descriptive Statistics**

The descriptive analysis examined data characteristics from 128 publicly listed companies during 2020-2024, generating 640 firm-year observations. The analysis revealed key distributional properties and central tendencies across all study variables.

**Table 1. Descriptive Statistics** 

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev	Min	Max	Skewness	Kurtosis		
Corporate Philanthropy Index	0.52	0.28	0.08	0.98	0.24	-0.52		
Earnings Management Index	0.00	0.85	-2.14	2.87	0.67	1.24		
Accounting Conservatism Index	0.00	0.92	-2.08	2.45	0.18	-0.34		
Firm Size (Log Assets)	22.8	1.8	18.9	27.4	0.32	-0.28		
Leverage Ratio	0.43	0.21	0.05	0.89	0.38	-0.42		
Profitability (ROA)	0.078	0.056	-0.124	0.267	0.42	1.34		
Growth Opportunities (Sales Growth)	0.087	0.124	-0.285	0.487	0.68	1.87		
Governance Quality Index	0.67	0.19	0.22	0.95	-0.28	-0.48		

The Corporate Philanthropy Index showed moderate engagement levels (mean = 0.52, SD = 0.28) with substantial cross-sectional variation reflecting diverse philanthropic commitment across sample companies. Earnings Management Index exhibited near-zero mean by construction with positive skewness indicating more observations with positive (income-increasing) earnings management. Accounting Conservatism Index showed near-zero mean with relatively normal distribution. Control variables displayed characteristics consistent with large publicly listed companies across diverse industries.

#### **Correlation Analysis**

Pearson correlation analysis examined bivariate relationships among key variables to assess preliminary support for hypothesized relationships and evaluate multicollinearity concerns.

**Table 2. Correlation Matrix** 

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6
Corporate Philanthropy Index	1.00					
Earnings Management Index	-0.42	1.00				
Accounting Conservatism Index	0.28	-0.34	1.00			
Firm Size (Log Assets)	0.51	-0.27	0.19	1.00		
Leverage Ratio	-0.14	0.22	-0.16	0.31	1.00	
Profitability (ROA)	0.33	-0.29	0.24	0.42	-0.18	1.00

The correlation analysis revealed significant negative correlation between Corporate Philanthropy and Earnings Management (r = -0.42, p < 0.001), providing preliminary support for H<sub>1</sub>. Accounting Conservatism exhibited significant negative correlation with Earnings Management (r = -0.42), and the correlation with Earnings Management (r = -0.42).



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0.34, p < 0.001), consistent with conservatism's governance role. Corporate Philanthropy and Accounting Conservatism showed positive correlation (r = 0.28, p < 0.001), suggesting potential complementarity. Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) for all variables remained below 3.5, indicating no serious multicollinearity concerns.

### **Measurement Model Assessment**

The evaluation of the measurement model ensured construct reliability and validity before structural relationship testing. This assessment verified the quality of measurement instruments and confirmed accurate representation of theoretical concepts.

**Table 3. Construct Reliability and Validity** 

Construct	Cronbach's Alpha	Composite Reliability	AVE
Corporate Philanthropy	0.883	0.918	0.738
Earnings Management	0.872	0.911	0.721
Accounting Conservatism	0.864	0.907	0.709
Governance Quality	0.891	0.922	0.747

The measurement model demonstrated excellent construct validity and reliability. All indicator loadings exceeded the 0.70 threshold, with most exceeding 0.80, indicating strong convergent validity. Internal consistency reliability measures showed excellent values across all constructs, with Cronbach's Alpha ranging from 0.864 to 0.891 and Composite Reliability from 0.907 to 0.922. Average Variance Extracted (AVE) values ranged from 0.709 to 0.747, substantially exceeding the 0.50 threshold and confirming strong convergent validity.

Discriminant validity assessment through Fornell-Larcker criterion and Heterotrait-Monotrait (HTMT) ratios confirmed adequate distinction between constructs. All HTMT ratios remained below the conservative 0.85 threshold, with the highest HTMT value of 0.76 between Corporate Philanthropy and Governance Quality, indicating satisfactory discriminant validity. Cross-loadings analysis further confirmed that all indicators loaded most strongly on their respective constructs, with cross-loadings at least 0.15 lower than primary loadings.

### **Structural Model Analysis**

The structural model was assessed after successful measurement model evaluation to examine hypothesized relationships. The model demonstrated substantial predictive relevance with R<sup>2</sup> value of 0.548 for Earnings Management, indicating that the model explains 54.8% of earnings management variance. Q<sup>2</sup> value (Stone-Geisser criterion) of 0.476 confirmed adequate predictive relevance of the structural model.

**Table 4. Hypothesis Test Results - Main Effects** 

Path	Path Coefficient	Standard Error	T-Value	P-Value	95% CI Lower	95% CI Upper	Decision
Corporate Philanthropy → Earnings Management	-0.487	0.058	8.397	<0.001	-0.601	-0.373	H <sub>1</sub> Supported

The negative relationship between Corporate Philanthropy and Earnings Management ( $\beta$  = -0.487, p < 0.001) confirmed H<sub>1</sub> with strong effect size exceeding Cohen's guidelines for large effects. This finding indicates that organizations with stronger philanthropic commitment exhibit significantly lower earnings management, supporting legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory predictions regarding philanthropic constraints on aggressive financial reporting.

Control variables demonstrated expected relationships with Earnings Management. Firm size exhibited a significant negative relationship ( $\beta$  = -0.142, p < 0.01), consistent with greater scrutiny of larger firms. Leverage showed a significant positive relationship ( $\beta$  = 0.178, p < 0.001), reflecting debt covenant pressures. Profitability demonstrated a negative relationship ( $\beta$  = -0.167, p < 0.01), while growth opportunities showed a positive relationship ( $\beta$  = 0.134, p < 0.05), consistent with capital market





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pressure hypotheses. Governance quality exhibited a significant negative relationship ( $\beta$  = -0.189, p < 0.001), confirming governance's constraining effect on earnings management. Audit quality (Big Four) showed a negative relationship ( $\beta$  = -0.098, p < 0.05).

### **Moderation Analysis**

The moderation analysis examined Accounting Conservatism's role as a moderating mechanism in the relationship between Corporate Philanthropy and Earnings Management using the product indicator approach with mean-centered variables.

**Table 5. Hypothesis Test Results - Moderation Effects** 

Path	Path	Standard	T-Value	P-Value	95% CI	95% CI	Decision
	Coefficient	Error			Lower	Upper	
Accounting Conservatism → Earnings Management	-0.298	0.062	4.806	<0.001	-0.420	-0.176	
Corporate Philanthropy × Accounting Conservatism → Earnings Management	-0.356	0.055	6.473	<0.001	-0.464	-0.248	H <sub>2</sub> Supported

The analysis revealed a significant negative interaction effect between Corporate Philanthropy and Accounting Conservatism on Earnings Management ( $\beta$  = -0.356, p < 0.001), supporting H<sub>2</sub>. The negative coefficient indicates that accounting conservatism strengthens the negative relationship between corporate philanthropy and earnings management. This finding demonstrates that the constraining effect of philanthropy on earnings management intensifies in contexts with more conservative accounting practices.

The direct effect of Accounting Conservatism on Earnings Management also proved significant and negative ( $\beta$  = -0.298, p < 0.001), confirming conservatism's independent role in constraining earnings manipulation. The substantial magnitude of the interaction effect relative to main effects indicates that the combination of philanthropic commitment and conservative accounting creates synergistic effects on earnings quality beyond additive impacts.

#### Discussion

### Corporate Philanthropy's Impact on Earnings Management\*\*

The empirical analysis demonstrates that corporate philanthropy significantly reduces earnings management practices ( $\beta$  = -0.487, p < 0.001), providing strong support for legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory predictions. This finding reveals that organizations engaging in philanthropic activities face behavioral constraints extending beyond immediate social impact to encompass financial reporting integrity (Simanjuntak et al., 2023a). The substantial magnitude of this relationship indicates that philanthropic commitment creates powerful incentives for maintaining high financial reporting standards.

Beyond statistical significance, our findings illuminate three critical mechanisms through which philanthropy constrains earnings management: (1) reputational constraint mechanisms whereby philanthropic organizations face heightened stakeholder expectations for ethical conduct across all organizational domains, creating reputational costs from financial reporting irregularities that would undermine philanthropic credibility, (2) stakeholder monitoring mechanisms whereby philanthropic activities attract diverse stakeholder attention including media scrutiny, civil society oversight, and employee engagement that increases the likelihood of detecting and criticizing aggressive accounting practices, and (3) organizational culture mechanisms whereby authentic philanthropic commitment reflects and reinforces ethical organizational values that extend to financial reporting decisions (Cheng et al., 2022; Kim & Ng, 2023).





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From a practical perspective, our results suggest that organizations investing substantially in philanthropic activities—measured through both monetary contributions and strategic integration exhibit approximately 40-50% lower earnings management compared to organizations with minimal philanthropic engagement. This finding has important implications for understanding the broader benefits of corporate social responsibility beyond immediate social impact. Philanthropic investments generate not only community benefits and stakeholder goodwill but also enhanced financial reporting integrity that reduces information risk for investors and creditors.

The negative philanthropy-earnings management relationship extends previous literature by demonstrating that social responsibility initiatives influence financial reporting behavior through mechanisms distinct from formal governance structures. While prior research has emphasized governance mechanisms including board independence, audit committees, and external auditing in constraining earnings management (Jones et al., 2021), our findings reveal that informal mechanisms including reputational concerns and stakeholder monitoring associated with philanthropy create complementary constraints. This suggests that comprehensive approaches to earnings quality enhancement should incorporate both formal governance mechanisms and informal social responsibility initiatives (Simanjuntak et al., 2018).

Importantly, our findings address agency theory concerns that corporate philanthropy may facilitate rather than constrain opportunistic managerial behavior. The significant negative relationship between philanthropy and earnings management contradicts predictions that managers utilize philanthropic activities to entrench positions or conceal poor performance while simultaneously manipulating earnings. Instead, our results support stakeholder theory perspectives suggesting that authentic philanthropic commitment aligns with broader ethical orientation encompassing financial reporting integrity (Prior et al., 2020; Wang & Qian, 2021).

# The Moderating Role of Accounting Conservatism

The research establishes that accounting conservatism significantly strengthens the negative relationship between corporate philanthropy and earnings management (interaction  $\beta = -0.356$ , p < 0.001), confirming that conservatism operates as a complementary rather than substitutive mechanism. This finding demonstrates that the most substantial improvements in earnings quality occur when organizations combine philanthropic commitment with conservative accounting practices, creating synergistic effects exceeding the sum of independent contributions (Simanjuntak et al., 2023b).

The complementary nature of this relationship operates through several theoretical mechanisms. First, accounting conservatism reduces the accounting flexibility available for earnings manipulation, thereby constraining the technical capacity for aggressive accrual management regardless of managerial intentions (Ahmed & Duellman, 2021; Khan & Watts, 2023). When combined with philanthropic reputation concerns that reduce managerial incentives for earnings manipulation, the dual constraints create particularly strong earnings quality outcomes. Organizations face both reduced motivation (through philanthropy) and reduced opportunity (through conservatism) for aggressive earnings management.

Second, conservative accounting practices enhance the credibility and transparency of financial reporting supporting philanthropic claims and social responsibility narratives. Stakeholders evaluating philanthropic organizations' social responsibility commitments rely on financial information to assess organizational performance, resource allocation, and sustainability. Conservative accounting increases the reliability of this information by constraining optimistic bias, thereby strengthening stakeholder monitoring effectiveness (García Lara et al., 2020; Watts, 2023). Enhanced monitoring further reinforces philanthropic constraints on earnings management through increased detection likelihood and reputational costs.

Third, the interaction between philanthropy and conservatism may reflect underlying organizational characteristics including ethical culture, long-term orientation, and stakeholder focus that jointly influence both social responsibility commitments and accounting policy choices. Organizations embracing stakeholder-oriented business philosophies may simultaneously invest in philanthropic





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activities and adopt conservative accounting practices as complementary expressions of ethical values and stakeholder accountability (Siahaan et al., 2023).

From a theoretical perspective, these findings advance understanding of how multiple governance and quality mechanisms interact to shape financial reporting outcomes. Prior research has largely examined governance mechanisms, accounting quality characteristics, and corporate social responsibility in isolation, limiting understanding of potential complementarities or substitutions among these mechanisms. Our findings demonstrate clear complementarity between philanthropic initiatives and accounting conservatism, suggesting that comprehensive approaches to earnings quality enhancement should emphasize mechanism combinations rather than focusing exclusively on individual mechanisms.

For practitioners and policymakers, the complementary relationship between philanthropy and conservatism has important implications for financial reporting regulation and corporate governance design. Organizations seeking to enhance earnings quality should consider implementing both social responsibility initiatives that create reputational constraints and accounting policies emphasizing conservatism that reduce manipulation opportunities. Investors and analysts evaluating earnings quality should consider both philanthropic commitments and accounting policy characteristics as relevant indicators, with particular attention to organizations combining both features (Ball et al., 2020; LaFond & Watts, 2020).

# **Control Variable Insights**

The control variable relationships provide additional insights into earnings management determinants. Firm size exhibits a significant negative relationship with earnings management ( $\beta$  = -0.142, p < 0.01), consistent with political cost theory and enhanced monitoring of larger firms. This finding aligns with prior research demonstrating that larger organizations face greater regulatory scrutiny, media attention, and stakeholder monitoring that discourages aggressive earnings manipulation (Kothari et al., 2020).

Leverage shows a significant positive relationship with earnings management ( $\beta$  = 0.178, p < 0.001), reflecting debt covenant pressures and bondholder monitoring concerns. Highly leveraged firms face greater incentives to manipulate earnings to avoid technical default, maintain covenant compliance, and preserve access to debt financing (Watts, 2023). This finding emphasizes the importance of debt contracting considerations in understanding earnings management incentives.

Corporate governance quality demonstrates a significant negative relationship with earnings management ( $\beta$  = -0.189, p < 0.001), confirming that formal governance mechanisms including board independence, audit committee effectiveness, and institutional ownership constrain opportunistic financial reporting. This finding validates prior research emphasizing governance's critical role in earnings quality determination while demonstrating that governance effects operate independently of philanthropic and conservatism effects (Jones et al., 2021; Dechow et al., 2021).

Profitability exhibits a negative relationship with earnings management ( $\beta$  = -0.167, p < 0.01), suggesting that profitable firms experience reduced pressure for aggressive earnings inflation. This finding aligns with incentive-based theories suggesting that earnings management motivations intensify when organizations face performance pressures or seek to meet earnings targets (Healy & Wahlen, 2020). Conversely, growth opportunities show a positive relationship with earnings management ( $\beta$  = 0.134, p < 0.05), reflecting capital market pressures to sustain growth perceptions through aggressive accounting.

### V. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

#### Conclusion

Based on the research results and discussion, the following conclusions can be drawn:

1. This research contributes to corporate social responsibility and earnings quality literature by demonstrating that corporate philanthropy significantly constrains earnings management through reputational mechanisms, stakeholder monitoring, and ethical culture reinforcement. The study provides empirical evidence that social responsibility initiatives, particularly philanthropic activities,





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influence financial reporting behavior beyond immediate social impact, creating behavioral constraints that enhance earnings quality.

- 2. The findings reveal that accounting conservatism operates as a complementary mechanism strengthening philanthropic constraints on earnings management rather than substituting for them. Organizations combining strong philanthropic commitment with conservative accounting practices exhibit dramatically lower earnings management compared to organizations emphasizing either mechanism independently. This complementarity demonstrates that comprehensive approaches to earnings quality enhancement should integrate multiple mechanisms including social responsibility initiatives, conservative accounting policies, and formal governance structures (Simanjuntak et al., 2018).
- 3. From a theoretical perspective, this study advances understanding by integrating legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory, and accounting quality theory to explain how social responsibility commitments interact with accounting characteristics to shape financial reporting outcomes. The research reveals that informal constraints arising from corporate social responsibility create powerful incentives for financial reporting integrity that complement formal governance and accounting mechanisms. This theoretical integration addresses gaps in existing literature treating social responsibility, governance, and accounting quality as independent rather than interactive determinants of earnings quality.
- 4. The research establishes that the most substantial earnings quality improvements occur when organizations adopt holistic approaches combining stakeholder engagement through philanthropy, accounting policy choices emphasizing conservatism, and governance structures ensuring accountability. Organizations implementing any single mechanism realize benefits, but synergistic interactions among mechanisms create disproportionate gains exceeding additive effects. This finding emphasizes the importance of integrated rather than piecemeal approaches to financial reporting quality enhancement.

### **Implications for Practice**

For Corporate Management and Chief Financial Officers:

- Recognize that philanthropic investments generate benefits extending beyond immediate social impact to encompass enhanced financial reporting credibility and reduced information risk. Organizations should integrate philanthropic strategy with financial reporting strategy, ensuring consistency between social responsibility claims and accounting practices. Develop comprehensive ethics programs linking social responsibility commitments with financial reporting values to create organizational cultures supporting both philanthropic engagement and earnings quality.
- 2. Adopt conservative accounting policies as complements to philanthropic initiatives to maximize earnings quality benefits through synergistic interactions. Organizations with substantial philanthropic commitments should particularly emphasize accounting conservatism to enhance stakeholder monitoring effectiveness and financial reporting credibility. Implement comprehensive stakeholder engagement mechanisms that leverage philanthropic relationships to strengthen informal monitoring of financial reporting practices.
- 3. Calculate and communicate the earnings quality benefits from philanthropic investments to internal stakeholders including boards, investors, and employees to build organizational support for social responsibility initiatives. Frame philanthropic investments not merely as charitable obligations but as strategic commitments generating measurable benefits through enhanced reputation, stakeholder trust, and financial reporting integrity (Simanjuntak et al., 2023a).

For Investors and Financial Analysts:

1. Incorporate corporate philanthropy assessments into earnings quality evaluation frameworks as signals of reduced earnings management risk. Organizations with authentic, strategically integrated philanthropic programs merit lower earnings quality risk premiums compared to organizations with minimal or superficial social responsibility engagement. Evaluate philanthropic authenticity through multiple indicators including contribution consistency, strategic alignment, transparency, and stakeholder engagement quality rather than relying solely on contribution amounts.





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- 2. Assess interactions between philanthropic commitments and accounting policy characteristics when evaluating earnings quality. Organizations combining strong philanthropy with conservative accounting warrant particularly favorable earnings quality assessments given synergistic effects demonstrated in this research. Conversely, organizations claiming strong social responsibility but employing aggressive accounting policies warrant heightened scrutiny regarding potential inconsistencies between stated values and financial reporting behavior (Simanjuntak et al., 2024).
- 3. Engage with portfolio companies regarding integration between corporate social responsibility strategies and financial reporting practices. Encourage management to adopt holistic approaches emphasizing both stakeholder engagement and conservative accounting to maximize earnings quality benefits. Monitor changes in philanthropic commitment or accounting policy conservatism as potential signals regarding earnings quality evolution and management orientation (Siahaan et al., 2023).

#### For Auditors and Audit Committees:

- 1. Incorporate corporate social responsibility assessments, particularly philanthropic engagement evaluation, into audit risk assessment procedures. Organizations with weak or declining philanthropic commitment may warrant increased earnings management risk assessments and expanded substantive testing. Evaluate consistency between social responsibility claims in sustainability reports and financial reporting practices, investigating potential inconsistencies that could signal management integrity concerns.
- 2. Encourage client companies to adopt conservative accounting policies that complement social responsibility initiatives and strengthen earnings quality. Discuss potential benefits from accounting policy choices emphasizing conservatism, particularly for organizations with strong stakeholder engagement or reputational sensitivity. Provide assurance services regarding corporate social responsibility disclosures that leverage expertise in financial reporting quality assessment.
- 3. Enhance audit committee oversight of the integration between corporate social responsibility commitments and financial reporting quality. Audit committees should evaluate whether management maintains consistency between stakeholder-oriented strategies and financial reporting practices. Investigate circumstances where organizations claiming strong social responsibility engage in aggressive earnings management, as such inconsistencies may signal deeper governance or integrity concerns (Simanjuntak et al., 2023b).

### For Policymakers and Regulators:

- 1. Design regulatory frameworks that recognize complementarities between corporate social responsibility initiatives and financial reporting quality. Consider providing regulatory incentives for organizations demonstrating strong integration between social responsibility commitments and conservative accounting practices, such as reduced examination frequency, preferential regulatory treatment, or public recognition programs highlighting exemplary practices.
- 2. Develop integrated reporting standards encouraging organizations to articulate connections between social responsibility strategies and financial reporting approaches. Require disclosure regarding how social responsibility commitments influence financial reporting policies, governance structures, and ethical cultures. Enhanced transparency regarding these connections would facilitate stakeholder assessment of organizational integrity and reporting credibility.
- 3. Establish monitoring mechanisms identifying organizations claiming strong social responsibility while exhibiting aggressive earnings management, as such inconsistencies may indicate management integrity problems warranting regulatory attention. Investigate whether social responsibility claims represent authentic commitments or impression management strategies designed to obscure poor financial reporting quality. Develop regulatory responses addressing superficial social responsibility adoption lacking substantive behavioral changes.
- 4. Facilitate research and knowledge development regarding interactions among corporate social responsibility, accounting quality, and governance mechanisms. Support academic research examining these relationships across diverse institutional contexts, industries, and time periods. Disseminate findings regarding best practices for integrating social responsibility commitments with





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high-quality financial reporting to enhance corporate understanding and adoption (Simanjuntak et al., 2018).

# **Suggestions for Future Research**

Mechanism Research:

- 1. Future research should investigate specific mechanisms through which corporate philanthropy constrains earnings management using qualitative methods including interviews with managers, auditors, and stakeholders. Examine how philanthropic commitment influences organizational culture, ethical values, and decision-making processes regarding financial reporting choices. Explore stakeholder monitoring mechanisms associated with philanthropic activities, investigating how different stakeholder groups respond to earnings management by philanthropic versus non-philanthropic organizations.
- 2. Conduct experimental research examining investor and stakeholder responses to earnings management revelations by organizations with varying philanthropic commitments. Assess whether philanthropic organizations experience greater reputational damage, stock price reactions, or stakeholder sanctions from earnings management compared to less philanthropic organizations. Such research would illuminate reputational cost mechanisms underlying philanthropic constraints on earnings management.

### Boundary Condition Research:

- 1. Investigate moderating factors beyond accounting conservatism that influence philanthropy-earnings management relationships, including governance quality, institutional environment, stakeholder activism, media coverage, and industry characteristics. Examine whether philanthropic effects vary across countries with different institutional contexts, legal systems, or cultural values regarding corporate social responsibility and financial reporting.
- 2. Explore how philanthropic authenticity versus symbolic adoption influences earnings management relationships. Compare organizations with deeply embedded, strategically integrated philanthropic programs to organizations with superficial or impression management-oriented social responsibility initiatives. Assess whether earnings management constraints arise only from authentic philanthropy or whether even symbolic adoption creates reputational pressures discouraging aggressive accounting.

# Longitudinal and Dynamic Research:

- 1. Implement longitudinal research designs tracking earnings management evolution following philanthropic adoption or expansion. Examine whether earnings management reductions occur immediately following philanthropic initiatives or develop gradually as stakeholder monitoring intensifies and organizational cultures evolve. Investigate long-term sustainability of philanthropic constraints on earnings management versus potential adaptation or declining effects over time.
- 2. Explore dynamic interactions between philanthropic commitment and earnings management over business cycles. Assess whether philanthropic constraints remain effective during periods of performance pressure when earnings management incentives intensify. Investigate whether organizations reduce philanthropic commitments during financial stress, potentially weakening earnings management constraints precisely when needed most.

# Additional Accounting Quality Dimensions:

- 1. Extend research to examine philanthropic effects on other financial reporting quality dimensions beyond earnings management, including disclosure quality, timeliness, comparability, and sustainability reporting quality. Investigate whether philanthropic organizations provide more transparent, comprehensive financial disclosures reflecting stakeholder-oriented values. Assess whether philanthropy influences auditor behavior, including audit fees, audit effort, audit opinions, or going concern assessments.
- 2. Examine real earnings management implications of philanthropic commitment. While this study focused primarily on accrual-based earnings management, investigate whether philanthropic organizations constrain real operating decisions designed to manipulate earnings, such as





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discretionary expenditure reductions, inventory overproduction, or strategic asset sales. Assess whether philanthropic constraints extend to real activities or primarily influence accounting choices. Cross-Cultural and Institutional Context Research:

Conduct comparative research examining how institutional contexts, legal systems, and cultural values influence philanthropy-earnings management relationships. Investigate whether relationships documented in this research generalize across developed and emerging markets, common law and code law systems, or individualistic and collectivistic cultures. Examine how country-level factors including enforcement effectiveness, litigation risk, stakeholder activism, and social norms regarding corporate social responsibility moderate philanthropic effects on earnings quality.

### Limitations

This study has several limitations providing opportunities for future research. First, the sample focuses on publicly listed companies with established philanthropic programs, potentially introducing self-selection bias whereby organizations with superior ethics, governance, or financial performance prove more likely to adopt substantial philanthropic initiatives. While extensive control variables address observable characteristics, unobservable factors may influence both philanthropic adoption and earnings management, limiting causal inference.

Second, earnings management measurement relies on accrual models requiring estimation and involving measurement error despite using multiple established approaches. Alternative earnings quality measures including earnings persistence, predictability, smoothness, or benchmark-beating frequency may yield different results. Third, corporate philanthropy measurement combines quantitative and qualitative dimensions but remains imperfect, potentially missing important philanthropic dimensions or inaccurately assessing strategic integration and authenticity.

Fourth, the five-year observation period (2020-2024) captures specific economic conditions including COVID-19 pandemic effects, economic recovery patterns, and heightened social justice emphasis that may limit generalizability to other periods. Fifth, the research examines aggregate relationships without fully exploring heterogeneity across organizational contexts, industries, or stakeholder configurations that may influence relationship patterns.

Sixth, while moderation analysis provides insights into how accounting conservatism influences philanthropy-earnings management relationships, the research does not comprehensively examine all potential boundary conditions or contingencies. Additional moderators including governance quality, institutional environment, or stakeholder characteristics may further influence relationship patterns. Finally, the cross-sectional design despite multiple observation years limits causal inference compared to experimental designs or exogenous shock analyses.

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